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sui-mcp

Wallet drainer: claim::swapS kit

Question: how did package 0xa032d8b8 take a wallet’s staked SUI on 28 November 2024 when a dry run at signing showed no loss, and who collected it?

Sources

Section titled “Sources”
Subject Value
Drainer package 0xa032d8b82cb3168ee197aab042edc9421cec42f305dbb6a474a047ec083b5083
Shared ClaimParams object 0x7188a53ee9daee5604da2649e7b87b100c6693e4ce6b9d411f8af799b9960ecd
Drain transaction F3TCZ6KiuZWosPhnNF4QrYsWuU4pbKncec6vkoVS9Vyd
75% collector 0x55abfb40f533b549e43cdd2711746b208052512ee72874f7a5851ce186489e0f
25% collector 0x532517d0f3d0d56566ab3580ca4d3b373a9303cb513c26dbdcf852582ba4e096

The steps below read the drainer’s package, objects and wallets. They do not need the signer’s address, and the excerpts leave it out.

Steps

Section titled “Steps”

1. Identify the package

Section titled “1. Identify the package”

identify_address on the package id:

{ "address": "0xa032d8b82cb3168ee197aab042edc9421cec42f305dbb6a474a047ec083b5083" }
"type": "package",
"flagged_by": [ { "kind": "package", "tier": "third-party", … } ],
"publisher": {
  "publisher": "0xf09d967bd112eb1d71dc1da09a7d19897dba1903d771eee970e72c0213806a5c",
  "publish_tx": "3LWaip5cvzmAWJZn2Rb87sC2i7HfxdEwnk613GxxSM91",
  "published_at": "2024-11-28T18:27:47.705Z"
},
"modules": [ "claim" ]

The package was published 36 minutes before the drain, by 0xf09d967b. A third-party scam blocklist lists it.

2. Read what the code does with a stake

Section titled “2. Read what the code does with a stake”

disassemble_module on the claim module:

{ "package_id": "0xa032d8b82cb3168ee197aab042edc9421cec42f305dbb6a474a047ec083b5083", "module_name": "claim" }
struct ClaimParams has key {
  id: UID,
  owner: address,
  delegate: address,
  initialized: bool,
  details: Option<ClaimDetails>,
  wallet: address,
  dev_wallet: address,
  profit_split: u8
}
…
entry public swapS(Arg0: &mut SuiSystemState, Arg1: StakedSui, Arg2: &mut ClaimParams, Arg3: &mut TxContext) {
  …
  1: ImmBorrowField[1](ClaimParams.initialized: bool)
  2: ReadRef
  3: BrFalse(64)
  …
  36: Call sui_system::request_withdraw_stake_non_entry(&mut SuiSystemState, StakedSui, &mut TxContext): Balance<SUI>
  …
  59: Call transfer::public_transfer<Coin<SUI>>(Coin<SUI>, address)
  …
  62: Call transfer::public_transfer<Coin<SUI>>(Coin<SUI>, address)
  …
  74: Call transfer::public_transfer<StakedSui>(StakedSui, address)
  …
}
…
entry public set_claimable(Arg0: &mut ClaimParams, Arg1: bool, Arg2: &mut TxContext) {
  …
  2: Call tx_context::sender(&TxContext): address
  …
  15: MutBorrowField[1](ClaimParams.initialized: bool)
  …
}

swapS branches on ClaimParams.initialized. When it is false (offset 64 on) the stake goes back to the sender. When it is true, the stake is withdrawn and the SUI is split by profit_split between wallet and dev_wallet. Only the object’s owner can call set_claimable to flip it.

3. Put the object’s changes on a timeline

Section titled “3. Put the object’s changes on a timeline”

trace_object_history on the shared ClaimParams:

{ "object_id": "0x7188a53ee9daee5604da2649e7b87b100c6693e4ce6b9d411f8af799b9960ecd" }
"history": [
  { "version": "418135263", "tx": "F1hZSV2waUBCiRQQgeyqj2AR7Xgquk6bwT4T6mfGULgZ", "timestamp": "2024-11-28T19:02:57.330Z", … },
  { "version": "418135264", "tx": "HBuiLzCyicPavHeVRrYoUGpDhWWAHMkYzX8oz2AwweBc", "timestamp": "2024-11-28T19:03:25.066Z", … },
  { "version": "418135265", "tx": "4nxCU6RYo2rayrcQPe99chqF1iAFu7fiMurqrHDsmtUL", "timestamp": "2024-11-28T19:03:28.797Z", … },
  { "version": "433094869", "tx": "F3TCZ6KiuZWosPhnNF4QrYsWuU4pbKncec6vkoVS9Vyd", "timestamp": "2024-11-28T19:03:29.732Z", … }
]

The object was created 32 seconds before the drain and written twice in the last five seconds before it.

4. Read the object as it was created

Section titled “4. Read the object as it was created”

get_object at the creation version:

{ "object_id": "0x7188a53ee9daee5604da2649e7b87b100c6693e4ce6b9d411f8af799b9960ecd", "version": "418135263" }
"content": {
  "details": { "coin_details": [ { "amount": "0", … }, { "amount": "0", … } ] },
  "dev_wallet": "0x532517d0f3d0d56566ab3580ca4d3b373a9303cb513c26dbdcf852582ba4e096",
  "initialized": false,
  "owner": "0xf09d967bd112eb1d71dc1da09a7d19897dba1903d771eee970e72c0213806a5c",
  "profit_split": 75,
  "wallet": "0x55abfb40f533b549e43cdd2711746b208052512ee72874f7a5851ce186489e0f",
  …
}

With initialized: false and zero amounts, a dry run against this version returns every object to the signer. The owner is the package publisher.

5. Break down the drain

Section titled “5. Break down the drain”

analyze_attack_tx on the drain:

{ "digest": "F3TCZ6KiuZWosPhnNF4QrYsWuU4pbKncec6vkoVS9Vyd" }
"recent_foreign_writes": [
  { "object": "0x7188a53ee9daee5604da2649e7b87b100c6693e4ce6b9d411f8af799b9960ecd",
    "writer": "0xf09d967bd112eb1d71dc1da09a7d19897dba1903d771eee970e72c0213806a5c",
    "digest": "4nxCU6RYo2rayrcQPe99chqF1iAFu7fiMurqrHDsmtUL", "ms_before": 935,
    "changed": [ { "path": "initialized", "kind": "gate", "before": "false", "after": "true" } ] },
  { …, "digest": "HBuiLzCyicPavHeVRrYoUGpDhWWAHMkYzX8oz2AwweBc", "ms_before": 4666,
    "changed": [ { "path": "details.coin_details[0].amount", "kind": "amount", "before": "0", "after": "5367827991" }, … ] }
],
"addresses": [
  …
  { "address": "0x55abfb40f533b549e43cdd2711746b208052512ee72874f7a5851ce186489e0f",
    "coins": [ { "symbol": "SUI", "amount": "520060685745", … }, … ] },
  { "address": "0x532517d0f3d0d56566ab3580ca4d3b373a9303cb513c26dbdcf852582ba4e096",
    "coins": [ { "symbol": "SUI", "amount": "173353561916", … }, … ] },
  …
],
"anomalies": [ { "severity": "high", "code": "switched-before-execution", … }, … ]

The publisher filled in the signer’s coin amounts 4.666 s before the drain and set initialized to true 0.935 s before it. The drain then paid 520.06 SUI to the 75% collector and 173.35 SUI to the 25% collector, 693.41 SUI in all. switched-before-execution is the flag for this pattern: a shared object another address rewrote just before the transaction ran, changing where value goes.

Section titled “6. Link the two collectors”

identify_address on the 75% collector:

{ "address": "0x55abfb40f533b549e43cdd2711746b208052512ee72874f7a5851ce186489e0f" }
"first_seen": {
  "digest": "CqwzuQvR94ZUzvrxR8KSig3HTTkN6DaLtK5Zic5nNRkd",
  "timestamp": "2024-11-08T21:22:29.002Z",
  "sender": "0x532517d0f3d0d56566ab3580ca4d3b373a9303cb513c26dbdcf852582ba4e096",
  "received": [ { "coin_type": "0x…0002::sui::SUI", "amount": "1570000000000" } ],
  "first_inflow": true
}

The 75% collector’s first inflow was 1,570 SUI from the 25% collector, twenty days before the drain.

first_seen.received is read across all balance-change pages of the first transaction, not just its first page. A system-created genesis allocation has checkpoint: "0", sender: null and first_inflow: true; it does not identify a funding wallet. If no gain was found and a continuation could not be read, first_inflow is null.

What this shows and what it does not

Section titled “What this shows and what it does not”
  • A dry run at signing reads shared objects as they are at that moment. A package whose behaviour depends on a shared object its author can rewrite can pass a dry run and still drain the wallet once the author flips it.
  • The bytecode, the object versions and the transfers are chain facts. That both collectors belong to the drainer’s operator is an inference from the split in the code and the funding link.
  • A blocklist entry is third-party context. A package missing from every list is not cleared by that.
  • switched-before-execution is a lead. A shared object legitimately updated by its protocol just before a user’s transaction can raise it too; read what changed in recent_foreign_writes.
Section titled “Related”