Protocol exploit: Cetus CLMM
The calls below inspect the first transaction of the 22 May 2025 Cetus CLMM exploit, aggregate its wallet’s gains and list outbound bridge exits.
Sources
Section titled “Sources”- Cetus, incident report
- Dedaub, the Cetus AMM $200M hack
- Case file:
cetus-2025-05.json
| Subject | Value |
|---|---|
| Attacker wallet | 0xe28b50cef1d633ea43d3296a3f6b67ff0312a5f1a99f0af753c85b8b5de8ff06 |
| First exploit transaction | DVMG3B2kocLEnVMDuQzTYRgjwuuFSfciawPvXXheB3x |
| haSUI/SUI pool | 0x871d8a227114f375170f149f7e9d45be822dd003eba225e83c05ac80828596bc |
1. Find the first exploit transaction
Section titled “1. Find the first exploit transaction”get_transaction_history
with the oldest transactions first:
{ "address": "0xe28b50cef1d633ea43d3296a3f6b67ff0312a5f1a99f0af753c85b8b5de8ff06", "order": "oldest", "limit": 5 }"transactions": [ { "digest": "EKHNUkpyzuzBg85rFXxpvXiR4kYU9quRXDCZNUmqYnuh", "timestamp": "2025-05-19T15:13:56.159Z", …, "status": "success", …, "subject_flow": [ { …, "formatted": "9.98065224 SUI", … } ] }, { "timestamp": "2025-05-22T07:26:03.159Z", "status": "failure", … }, { "digest": "DVMG3B2kocLEnVMDuQzTYRgjwuuFSfciawPvXXheB3x", "timestamp": "2025-05-22T10:30:50.476Z", …, "status": "success", …, "subject_flow": [ { …, "formatted": "5765124.463062928 SUI", … }, { …, "formatted": "10024321.275017081 haSUI", … } ] }, …]The first successful exploit transaction is DVMG3B2k… at 10:30:50 UTC.
The earlier transaction at 07:26 failed. Cetus’s report gives the same start
time, and Dedaub identifies DVMG3B2k… as an attack transaction.
2. Break down the first exploit transaction
Section titled “2. Break down the first exploit transaction”{ "digest": "DVMG3B2kocLEnVMDuQzTYRgjwuuFSfciawPvXXheB3x" }"profit": { "address": "0xe28b50cef1d633ea43d3296a3f6b67ff0312a5f1a99f0af753c85b8b5de8ff06", "gains": [ { …, "symbol": "haSUI", …, "amount": "10024321275017081", … }, { …, "symbol": "SUI", …, "amount": "5765124463062928", … } ], …},"swaps": [ { …, "pool": "0x871d8a227114f375170f149f7e9d45be822dd003eba225e83c05ac80828596bc", …, "price_change_pct": -99.999906, … }],"anomalies": [ { "severity": "high", "code": "outsized-mint", … }, { "severity": "high", "code": "shared-state-jump", … }, … { "severity": "info", "code": "flashloan-pattern", … }]The transaction’s balance changes credit the wallet 10,024,321.28 haSUI and
5,765,124.46 SUI. The haSUI/SUI pool price changed by about −99.9999%.
outsized-mint flags liquidity credited in excess of what the deposited
amounts could buy. Dedaub attributes the exploit to a flawed overflow check
in the liquidity calculation.
3. Total the whole run
Section titled “3. Total the whole run”summarize_incident_losses
over every transaction the attacker sent in the exploit window:
{ "sender": "0xe28b50cef1d633ea43d3296a3f6b67ff0312a5f1a99f0af753c85b8b5de8ff06", "start": "2025-05-22T10:30:00Z", "end": "2025-05-22T10:46:00Z", "max_groups": 15 }"transactions_read": 287,"priced_coins": [ { …, "symbol": "USDC", …, "attacker_net_raw": "55429398247450", … }, { …, "symbol": "SUI", …, "attacker_net_raw": "12989333115670313", … }, { …, "symbol": "haSUI", …, "attacker_net_raw": "10138247832730473", … }, …],"failed_transactions": [ … ],"groups": [ { "pools": [ "0x871d8a227114f375170f149f7e9d45be822dd003eba225e83c05ac80828596bc" ], …, "transactions": [ "DVMG3B2kocLEnVMDuQzTYRgjwuuFSfciawPvXXheB3x" ], … }, …]The attacker sent 287 transactions in the selected 10:30–10:46 UTC window, 22
of which failed. priced_coins reports the per-coin net from balance changes;
the excerpt shows raw units to avoid rounding large floating-point amounts.
usd_basis gives historical pricing coverage;
totals.partial indicates missing prices or object values. A partial net
is not a lower bound because debits may also be missing.
4. Find where the proceeds left Sui
Section titled “4. Find where the proceeds left Sui”summarize_address_flows
from the end of the exploit to the end of the day:
{ "address": "0xe28b50cef1d633ea43d3296a3f6b67ff0312a5f1a99f0af753c85b8b5de8ff06", "from": "2025-05-22T10:46:00Z", "to": "2025-05-23T00:00:00Z" }"coverage": { …, "complete": true, … },"coins": [ { …, "symbol": "USDC", …, "in": 5885703.591291, "out": 61315101.836523, "net": -55429398.245232, … }, { …, "symbol": "SUI", …, "in": 11033566.975673009, "out": 24022900.75773294, "net": -12989333.782059932, … }, { …, "symbol": "haSUI", …, "in": 0.008952314, "out": 10138247.841682788, "net": -10138247.832730472, … }, { …, "symbol": "USDT", …, "in": 0, "out": 19013239.615614, "net": -19013239.615614, … }, …],"top_recipients": [ { "address": "0xcd8962dad278d8b50fa0f9eb0186bfa4cbdecc6d59377214c88d0286a0ac9562", "coins": [ { "symbol": "SUI", "amount": 24022895.1732351, … } ], … }, …],"bridge_exits": { "transaction_count": 76, "by_bridge": [ { "bridge": "Wormhole", "transactions": 4, … "destinations": [ { …, "account": "eip155:1:0x89012a55cd6b88e407c9d4ae9b3425f55924919b", … }, { …, "account": "eip155:56:0x89012a55cd6b88e407c9d4ae9b3425f55924919b", … } ] }, { "bridge": "Circle CCTP", "transactions": 7, "sent": [ { "symbol": "USDC", "amount": 6885703.589073, … } ], … }, { "bridge": "Mayan MCTP", "transactions": 55, "sent": [ { "symbol": "USDC", "amount": 54429398.24745, … } ], … }, { "bridge": "Sui Bridge", "transactions": 10, … } ]}All 76 bridge exits in bridge_exits.transaction_count name 0x89012a55 as
the recipient, the Ethereum address the Cetus report gives; the Wormhole rows
list it under both Ethereum and BNB Chain. Each bridge’s destinations lists
the accounts its exits name. The top
Sui recipient, 0xcd8962da…, received 24,022,895.17 SUI; Cetus
identifies it as a second attacker wallet. coverage.complete: true
means the address scan reached the end of the selected window.
The wallet’s SUI and USDC inflows and outflows are larger than step 3’s
totals because it swapped other coins into SUI and USDC in this window;
unattributed_inflows and unattributed_outflows list those transactions.
The nets, about 12,989,333.78 SUI and 55,429,398.25 USDC out, match step 3’s
12,989,333.12 SUI and 55,429,398.25 USDC to within one SUI. The CCTP and
Mayan MCTP rows send 61,315,101.84 USDC of the Circle coin type, the window’s
whole outflow of that coin type. Wormhole also sent 932,137.18 USDC of a
different coin type.
5. Check who funded the wallet
Section titled “5. Check who funded the wallet”{ "address": "0xe28b50cef1d633ea43d3296a3f6b67ff0312a5f1a99f0af753c85b8b5de8ff06" }"chain": [ { …, "funded_by": "0xff1070d40277a3d748a3222b44eab08ed588b256094ecdc2090badf0f9f5e9f4", "funding_tx": "EKHNUkpyzuzBg85rFXxpvXiR4kYU9quRXDCZNUmqYnuh", "timestamp": "2025-05-19T15:13:56.159Z", "amount": "9.98065224 SUI", … }],"origin_popularity": { "popular": true, … },"stop_reason": "reached a high-fanout distributor … ancestry beyond it carries no attribution"origin_popularity.popular means the funder paid more than 50 addresses, so
the funding walk stops there. Neither Cetus nor Dedaub names a funder.
Evidence and limits
Section titled “Evidence and limits”- The amounts, digests, timestamps and bridge recipients are read from the chain and do not depend on a third party.
- Coin USD figures use historical quotes near each transaction; objects use their transaction times. Partial pricing can leave out credits or debits.
- The anomaly flags point at the mechanism but do not prove it. The case file
confirms it by reading the pool’s bytecode with
disassemble_moduleand the fix withdiff_package_upgrade; the Typus example shows that method. - The funder is a high-fanout wallet. Being funded by it is not a link to its other recipients.
- Bridge exits end the Sui side of the trace. What happened on Ethereum is not read.
Related
Section titled “Related”- Fund flows: tracing, first-in-first-out allocation and path finding.
- Reading a transaction: failed transactions and objects that are not coins.
- Truncated lists: the
truncatedandomittedfields these answers carry.