Security model
No wallet, no keys
Section titled “No wallet, no keys”The server has no wallet credentials and no ability to move funds:
- It never accepts a private key, mnemonic, or seed phrase. No tool takes one as an argument and nothing in the code reads one from the environment.
- It never submits a transaction.
build_transferandbuild_stakingreturn unsigned BCS bytes that you sign and broadcast somewhere else;simulate_transactiondry-runs bytes against a fullnode without executing them. - Other tools read chain or provider data, or manage the optional local store.
- Public RPC and indexing endpoints need no provider account. Aftermath,
DefiLlama, CoinGecko and GeckoTerminal prices need no key; Pyth is opt-in
through
PYTH_API_KEY.
What the process does
Section titled “What the process does”The server uses these runtime capabilities:
| Capability | Where it’s used |
|---|---|
| Network | Public Sui RPC and GraphQL; Pyth, Aftermath and DefiLlama for prices and the verified coin list; CoinGecko and GeckoTerminal for recent historical prices; the Move Registry for name resolution; the DeepBook indexer for order-book data; the Wormholescan and LayerZero Scan APIs for bridge transfers. Most hosts are in src/config.ts, src/utils/price-providers.ts and src/utils/recent-prices.ts; the bridge APIs are in src/utils/bridge/. |
| Filesystem | Temp files for decompile_module. Reading SUI_LABELS_FILE, and the SQLite store at SUI_STORE_PATH, when you set them. Reading the forensics skill and data files shipped in the package. SUI_REPLAY_DIR, which the test harness sets, records and replays chain reads in the directory it names. |
| Subprocess | One call, in src/tools/decompiler.ts, to the decompiler binary you build and configure yourself. It uses execFile with array arguments, so no shell is involved and nothing is interpolated into a command string. |
| Environment | The SUI_-prefixed variables in .env.example, the optional price-provider key PYTH_API_KEY, PATH when looking for the decompiler, and the test harness switches SUI_REPLAY_DIR and SUI_DISABLE_LIVE_COIN_LIST. Nothing else is read. |
There is no eval, no dynamic require, no minified or obfuscated code, and
no telemetry. Inputs that come from the chain are treated as untrusted:
decompile_module validates module names before they reach a filesystem path
and bounds the modules processed in one call.
Chain and provider text
Section titled “Chain and provider text”Coin metadata, NFT Display fields, event JSON, object content, SuiNS names,
Move code and imported labels can be written by someone other than the
investigator. A JSON tool result containing guarded readable text carries
one untrusted_text boundary note. The data remains evidence to examine,
never an instruction to follow, even when it claims to come from the server
or the investigator.
Every string and object key in a tool result shows hidden characters as
visible \u escapes: controls, bidirectional formatting, zero-width and
invisible characters, variation selectors and Unicode tag characters, which
can spell out text a reader never sees. Joiners and selectors that form an
emoji or a word in a script shaped with them are kept, and so are the tags of
the England, Scotland and Wales flags.
Human-readable fields (names, symbols, descriptions, labels, notes,
summaries, decoded transaction arguments) escape HTML tags and Markdown
formatting and are cut after 2,048 characters, with the number removed.
A field that is a single http, https, ipfs, ipns, ar, ws
or wss URL keeps its spelling; a data: URI is text and is cut like other
text. Inside decoded chain data (event JSON, aggregate_events event
samples, object content, Display fields) the field names are chosen by
whoever wrote the data, so every string there is escaped unless it is one
complete, balanced Move type tag or hex bytes. A whole-field or decoded-key
type tag is a struct path, primitive, type parameter or vector type; bare
generic names such as Box<address> are text. Field names that are not Move
identifiers or complete type tags are escaped too. Addresses, digests, amounts,
full-path Move type tags (including 0x2::balance::Balance<T0>), hex bytes
such as a pure vector<u8> argument and continuation calls keep their
spelling apart from hidden characters and are never cut. Error messages show
hidden characters only, so a type tag they quote stays usable. Code listings
keep their lines and type tags, so their contents must still be read as
untrusted data.
Arrows and comparisons in evidence keep their punctuation (->, a < b,
x > y). Generic types with struct paths remain readable within a sentence,
including Pool<0x2::sui::SUI, 0xabc::usdc::USDC>. HTML tag openers inside
an embedded generic are escaped (Box<address> and Balance<T>), as are
CommonMark URI autolinks such as <ab::m::T> and underscores that can open
emphasis. HTML tag openers, Markdown links, emphasis and leading blockquotes
are escaped, so they do not become active formatting.
Registered chain-reading tools guard their JSON results before any
structuredContent is built; enable_tools is a control tool with no chain
data. Plain-text items keep their formatting and show hidden characters
only: the prose summaries that trace_funds, trace_flow_graph,
find_flow_path, analyze_attack_tx and summarize_incident_losses return
before their JSON, the Markdown, Mermaid and CSV outputs of export_case
and the sui://case/{name} report, and the Mermaid and CSV outputs of the
trace and flow tools. A summary can quote labels and coin symbols, and
a Mermaid or CSV result carries no JSON untrusted_text field. Clients
must render tool text as data instead of active HTML.
Stored-result resource pages guard each row under the name of the list it came from, by the same field rules as the tool’s own response.
The server speaks stdio only. From the MCP SDK it imports server/mcp.js,
server/stdio.js and types.js, so the SDK’s HTTP-transport dependencies are
installed but never loaded.
Verifying a release
Section titled “Verifying a release”Releases are published from CI with npm provenance, so every tarball carries a signed attestation tying it to the commit and workflow run that produced it:
npm audit signaturesReporting a vulnerability
Section titled “Reporting a vulnerability”See Security policy.