Package authority: Typus oracle
The first exploit transaction on 15 October 2025 called a Typus oracle package. The calls below identify the version, its UpgradeCap holder and the function’s sender check.
Sources
Section titled “Sources”- Typus, TLP oracle exploit post-mortem
- SlowMist, the Typus permission validation vulnerability
- Sui Developer Forum, how a missing assert drained Typus Finance
- Case file:
typus-2025-10.json
| Subject | Value |
|---|---|
| First exploit transaction | 6KJvWtmrZDi5MxUPkJfDNZTLf2DFGKhQA2WuVAdSRUgH |
| Oracle package, original id | 0x855eb2d260ee42b898266e6df90bfd3c4ed821ccb253a352c159c223244a4b8a |
| Oracle version the exploit called | 0x4658a0fbd9a234dfc87726addcbe1a602f27ce4513ecc1ec99e6d973c7bfb101 |
| Oracle version after the fix | 0x1ead8a0d21d4eb446a75e9125c2e53e9c6505c863c05424c6e898ee3415efbe4 |
1. Read what the exploit passed to the oracle
Section titled “1. Read what the exploit passed to the oracle”decode_ptb on the first exploit
transaction:
{ "digest": "6KJvWtmrZDi5MxUPkJfDNZTLf2DFGKhQA2WuVAdSRUgH" }"commands": [ … { "index": 1, "type": "MoveCall", "target": "0x4658a0fbd9a234dfc87726addcbe1a602f27ce4513ecc1ec99e6d973c7bfb101::oracle::update_v2", "arguments": [ { "object_id": "0x0a318f26fcf35922a8671a2d843872a7a25ac10b678bdee52f10fbc77140c0d0", "object_type": "oracle::Oracle", … }, { "object_id": "0xef710183951f400bc1480bab662d793e7ff324192a2518d8bd036358d9f0fb85", "object_type": "oracle::UpdateAuthority", … }, { "value_type": "u64", "value": "651548270", … }, { "value_type": "u64", "value": "651548270", … }, … ], … }, { "index": 2, "type": "MoveCall", "target": "0x4658a0fb…::oracle::update_v2", "arguments": [ { "object_type": "oracle::Oracle", … }, … { "value": "1", … }, { "value": "1", … }, … ], … }, { "index": 3, "type": "MoveCall", "target": "…::lp_pool::swap", … }, …]The excerpt shows the first two update_v2 calls, with price inputs
651548270 and 1, followed by a pool swap. The transaction calls
update_v2 twelve times in total. Both shown calls pass an
UpdateAuthority object by reference.
2. Find the version and who held the upgrade authority
Section titled “2. Find the version and who held the upgrade authority”get_upgrade_history
with as_of set to the exploit:
{ "package": "0x855eb2d260ee42b898266e6df90bfd3c4ed821ccb253a352c159c223244a4b8a", "as_of": "2025-10-15T13:05:14Z" }"as_of": { …, "cap_state": "held", "holder": { "kind": "address", "address": "0xb9a09efd534d29cc9f990db26b2dab00289f32de0cdcefa68c6808de208bc9cb", "scheme": "multisig threshold 3 of 8 weight" }, "policy": "compatible", "newest_version": { "version": 9, "package_id": "0x4658a0fbd9a234dfc87726addcbe1a602f27ce4513ecc1ec99e6d973c7bfb101", "published_at": "2025-08-12T02:37:43.250Z", … }, …},"versions": [ … { "version": 10, "package_id": "0x1ead8a0d21d4eb446a75e9125c2e53e9c6505c863c05424c6e898ee3415efbe4", …, "timestamp": "2025-10-16T13:34:50.852Z", "sender": "0xb9a09efd534d29cc9f990db26b2dab00289f32de0cdcefa68c6808de208bc9cb", … }, …]Version 9 was the newest package at the exploit checkpoint and the version called. A 3-of-8 multisig held its UpgradeCap and published version 10 the next day. The upgrade holder and the function’s caller authority are separate checks.
3. Check who can call the function
Section titled “3. Check who can call the function”{ "package_id": "0x4658a0fbd9a234dfc87726addcbe1a602f27ce4513ecc1ec99e6d973c7bfb101", "module_name": "oracle", "function_name": "update_v2" }"visibility": "public","is_entry": true,"parameters": [ "&mut 0x855eb2d2…::oracle::Oracle", "&0x855eb2d2…::oracle::UpdateAuthority", "u64", "u64", "&0x…0002::clock::Clock", "&mut 0x…0002::tx_context::TxContext"]update_v2 is a public entry function. It accepts a shared
UpdateAuthority by reference, so a caller need not own the object.
Authorization depends on the function body.
4. Read the function body
Section titled “4. Read the function body”disassemble_module with
function_name:
{ "package_id": "0x4658a0fbd9a234dfc87726addcbe1a602f27ce4513ecc1ec99e6d973c7bfb101", "module_name": "oracle", "function_name": "update_v2" }entry public update_v2(Arg0: &mut Oracle, Arg1: &UpdateAuthority, Arg2: u64, Arg3: u64, Arg4: &Clock, Arg5: &mut TxContext) { … 1: ImmBorrowField[1](UpdateAuthority.authority: vector<address>) … 5: Call tx_context::sender(&TxContext): address … 9: Call vector::contains<address>(&vector<address>, &address): bool 10: Pop … 13: Call version_check(&Oracle) … 20: Call update_(&mut Oracle, u64, u64, &Clock, &TxContext) 21: Ret}vector::contains compares the sender with the authority list. Pop
discards its result before update_ writes the price. Typus, SlowMist
and the forum post describe the missing assertion.
5. Let the package scan find it
Section titled “5. Let the package scan find it”analyze_package on the same
version, capability audit off:
{ "package_id": "0x4658a0fbd9a234dfc87726addcbe1a602f27ce4513ecc1ec99e6d973c7bfb101", "audit_capabilities": false }"findings": [ … { "severity": "medium", "code": "discarded-check", "title": "Check result reaches no use", … "leads": [ { "function": "oracle::update_v2", "grade": "strong", … "instructions": [ "oracle::update_v2: 9: Call vector::contains<address>(&vector<address>, &address): bool" ] } ], … }, …]The scan reports oracle::update_v2 as a strong discarded-check lead.
The disassembly in step 4 shows the discarded check and subsequent write.
6. See what the fix changed
Section titled “6. See what the fix changed”diff_package_upgrade
from version 9 to 10:
{ "package": "0x855eb2d260ee42b898266e6df90bfd3c4ed821ccb253a352c159c223244a4b8a", "from_version": 9, "to_version": 10 }"diff": { "added_functions": [ { "signature": "public burn_update_authority(Arg0: UpdateAuthority)", … }, { "signature": "entry create_update_cap(Arg0: &ManagerCap, Arg1: address, Arg2: &mut TxContext)", … }, … { "signature": "public update_with_update_cap(Arg0: &mut Oracle, Arg1: &UpdateCap, Arg2: u64, Arg3: u64, Arg4: &Clock, Arg5: &TxContext)", … } ], "removed_functions": [ { "function": "new_update_authority", … }, { "function": "add_update_authority", … }, … ], "visibility_changes": [ …, { "module": "oracle", "function": "update_v2", "from": "public entry", "to": "public", … } ], …}Version 10 added create_update_cap, which issues an UpdateCap from the
ManagerCap, update_with_update_cap and burn_update_authority, removed the
functions that create and extend an UpdateAuthority, and removed entry from
update_v2. Reading version 10’s update_v2 with disassemble_module shows
LdU64(0) followed by Abort, so it no longer writes a price.
Evidence and limits
Section titled “Evidence and limits”- The bytecode, the version dates and the multisig holder are chain facts. The finding in step 5 is a lead that step 4 confirms by reading the code.
- A package whose upgrade authority sits with a multisig can still be exploited through a function that needs no authority at all. Check both.
- Older versions of a package stay callable after an upgrade unless the code
checks a version number.
analyze_packagereports older versions that skip a check the newest makes asungated-older-version. - A scan with no
discarded-checklead has not cleared the package. The scan follows a fixed set of data-flow shapes; arithmetic, pricing and ordering errors are outside them.
Related
Section titled “Related”- Packages and upgrade authority: the
upgrade history,
as_of, and the UpgradeCap holder. - Packages and upgrade authority: upgrade diffs and bytecode leads.
- KONG SUI rug pull: the capability audit on a coin package.