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Package authority: Typus oracle

The first exploit transaction on 15 October 2025 called a Typus oracle package. The calls below identify the version, its UpgradeCap holder and the function’s sender check.

Subject Value
First exploit transaction 6KJvWtmrZDi5MxUPkJfDNZTLf2DFGKhQA2WuVAdSRUgH
Oracle package, original id 0x855eb2d260ee42b898266e6df90bfd3c4ed821ccb253a352c159c223244a4b8a
Oracle version the exploit called 0x4658a0fbd9a234dfc87726addcbe1a602f27ce4513ecc1ec99e6d973c7bfb101
Oracle version after the fix 0x1ead8a0d21d4eb446a75e9125c2e53e9c6505c863c05424c6e898ee3415efbe4

1. Read what the exploit passed to the oracle

Section titled “1. Read what the exploit passed to the oracle”

decode_ptb on the first exploit transaction:

{ "digest": "6KJvWtmrZDi5MxUPkJfDNZTLf2DFGKhQA2WuVAdSRUgH" }
"commands": [
…
{ "index": 1, "type": "MoveCall",
"target": "0x4658a0fbd9a234dfc87726addcbe1a602f27ce4513ecc1ec99e6d973c7bfb101::oracle::update_v2",
"arguments": [
{ "object_id": "0x0a318f26fcf35922a8671a2d843872a7a25ac10b678bdee52f10fbc77140c0d0", "object_type": "oracle::Oracle", … },
{ "object_id": "0xef710183951f400bc1480bab662d793e7ff324192a2518d8bd036358d9f0fb85", "object_type": "oracle::UpdateAuthority", … },
{ "value_type": "u64", "value": "651548270", … },
{ "value_type": "u64", "value": "651548270", … },
…
], … },
{ "index": 2, "type": "MoveCall", "target": "0x4658a0fb…::oracle::update_v2",
"arguments": [
{ "object_type": "oracle::Oracle", … },
…
{ "value": "1", … },
{ "value": "1", … },
…
], … },
{ "index": 3, "type": "MoveCall", "target": "…::lp_pool::swap", … },
…
]

The excerpt shows the first two update_v2 calls, with price inputs 651548270 and 1, followed by a pool swap. The transaction calls update_v2 twelve times in total. Both shown calls pass an UpdateAuthority object by reference.

2. Find the version and who held the upgrade authority

Section titled “2. Find the version and who held the upgrade authority”

get_upgrade_history with as_of set to the exploit:

{ "package": "0x855eb2d260ee42b898266e6df90bfd3c4ed821ccb253a352c159c223244a4b8a", "as_of": "2025-10-15T13:05:14Z" }
"as_of": {
…,
"cap_state": "held",
"holder": {
"kind": "address",
"address": "0xb9a09efd534d29cc9f990db26b2dab00289f32de0cdcefa68c6808de208bc9cb",
"scheme": "multisig threshold 3 of 8 weight"
},
"policy": "compatible",
"newest_version": {
"version": 9,
"package_id": "0x4658a0fbd9a234dfc87726addcbe1a602f27ce4513ecc1ec99e6d973c7bfb101",
"published_at": "2025-08-12T02:37:43.250Z", …
}, …
},
"versions": [
…
{ "version": 10, "package_id": "0x1ead8a0d21d4eb446a75e9125c2e53e9c6505c863c05424c6e898ee3415efbe4", …,
"timestamp": "2025-10-16T13:34:50.852Z",
"sender": "0xb9a09efd534d29cc9f990db26b2dab00289f32de0cdcefa68c6808de208bc9cb", … },
…
]

Version 9 was the newest package at the exploit checkpoint and the version called. A 3-of-8 multisig held its UpgradeCap and published version 10 the next day. The upgrade holder and the function’s caller authority are separate checks.

get_move_function:

{ "package_id": "0x4658a0fbd9a234dfc87726addcbe1a602f27ce4513ecc1ec99e6d973c7bfb101",
"module_name": "oracle", "function_name": "update_v2" }
"visibility": "public",
"is_entry": true,
"parameters": [
"&mut 0x855eb2d2…::oracle::Oracle",
"&0x855eb2d2…::oracle::UpdateAuthority",
"u64",
"u64",
"&0x…0002::clock::Clock",
"&mut 0x…0002::tx_context::TxContext"
]

update_v2 is a public entry function. It accepts a shared UpdateAuthority by reference, so a caller need not own the object. Authorization depends on the function body.

disassemble_module with function_name:

{ "package_id": "0x4658a0fbd9a234dfc87726addcbe1a602f27ce4513ecc1ec99e6d973c7bfb101",
"module_name": "oracle", "function_name": "update_v2" }
entry public update_v2(Arg0: &mut Oracle, Arg1: &UpdateAuthority, Arg2: u64, Arg3: u64, Arg4: &Clock, Arg5: &mut TxContext) {
…
1: ImmBorrowField[1](UpdateAuthority.authority: vector<address>)
…
5: Call tx_context::sender(&TxContext): address
…
9: Call vector::contains<address>(&vector<address>, &address): bool
10: Pop
…
13: Call version_check(&Oracle)
…
20: Call update_(&mut Oracle, u64, u64, &Clock, &TxContext)
21: Ret
}

vector::contains compares the sender with the authority list. Pop discards its result before update_ writes the price. Typus, SlowMist and the forum post describe the missing assertion.

analyze_package on the same version, capability audit off:

{ "package_id": "0x4658a0fbd9a234dfc87726addcbe1a602f27ce4513ecc1ec99e6d973c7bfb101", "audit_capabilities": false }
"findings": [
…
{ "severity": "medium", "code": "discarded-check", "title": "Check result reaches no use", …
"leads": [
{ "function": "oracle::update_v2", "grade": "strong", …
"instructions": [ "oracle::update_v2: 9: Call vector::contains<address>(&vector<address>, &address): bool" ] }
], … },
…
]

The scan reports oracle::update_v2 as a strong discarded-check lead. The disassembly in step 4 shows the discarded check and subsequent write.

diff_package_upgrade from version 9 to 10:

{ "package": "0x855eb2d260ee42b898266e6df90bfd3c4ed821ccb253a352c159c223244a4b8a", "from_version": 9, "to_version": 10 }
"diff": {
"added_functions": [
{ "signature": "public burn_update_authority(Arg0: UpdateAuthority)", … },
{ "signature": "entry create_update_cap(Arg0: &ManagerCap, Arg1: address, Arg2: &mut TxContext)", … },
…
{ "signature": "public update_with_update_cap(Arg0: &mut Oracle, Arg1: &UpdateCap, Arg2: u64, Arg3: u64, Arg4: &Clock, Arg5: &TxContext)", … }
],
"removed_functions": [ { "function": "new_update_authority", … }, { "function": "add_update_authority", … }, … ],
"visibility_changes": [ …, { "module": "oracle", "function": "update_v2", "from": "public entry", "to": "public", … } ],
…
}

Version 10 added create_update_cap, which issues an UpdateCap from the ManagerCap, update_with_update_cap and burn_update_authority, removed the functions that create and extend an UpdateAuthority, and removed entry from update_v2. Reading version 10’s update_v2 with disassemble_module shows LdU64(0) followed by Abort, so it no longer writes a price.

  • The bytecode, the version dates and the multisig holder are chain facts. The finding in step 5 is a lead that step 4 confirms by reading the code.
  • A package whose upgrade authority sits with a multisig can still be exploited through a function that needs no authority at all. Check both.
  • Older versions of a package stay callable after an upgrade unless the code checks a version number. analyze_package reports older versions that skip a check the newest makes as ungated-older-version.
  • A scan with no discarded-check lead has not cleared the package. The scan follows a fixed set of data-flow shapes; arithmetic, pricing and ordering errors are outside them.