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Token rug pull: KONG SUI

The following calls inspect KONG SUI’s mint and upgrade authority, a deployer swap and transfers after the October 2024 sale.

Subject Value
Coin package 0xb0c3e7ae67c9161273aab9a06e589c1c13479337d14c794251a97df46822f2cb
Deployer 0x70f1042521565aa5c3fb887f939ef05e8dee264cc11ee07735132691801d360d
Consolidation wallet 0xfbbab0fdf16bd65d7ff7d17b86e0086892573337b6e7f466794506bc8aa6c0f3

analyze_package on the coin package. The capability audit runs by default:

{ "package_id": "0xb0c3e7ae67c9161273aab9a06e589c1c13479337d14c794251a97df46822f2cb" }
"root_publisher": {
"publisher": "0x70f1042521565aa5c3fb887f939ef05e8dee264cc11ee07735132691801d360d",
"publish_tx": "99s8gEPTAvdks4xwUVNvtrWDg1npNH3NJKatjqLyKJ7q",
"published_at": "2024-09-26T05:54:55.924Z", …
},
"capabilities": { "checked": true, "capabilities": [
{ "kind": "upgrade", "owner": "burned", "risk": "info", … },
{ "kind": "treasury", "owner": "address",
"owner_address": "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000", "risk": "info", … }
] }

The UpgradeCap is destroyed, and the TreasuryCap’s recorded owner is the unspendable 0x0 address. The audited capabilities cannot authorize further upgrades or minting.

get_transaction on the deployer’s swap on the day of the collapse:

{ "digest": "rC4ijs7mTe3KXnY1ChDVWXmxyHAXLBrJpyiU4jovPA1" }
"sender": "0x70f1042521565aa5c3fb887f939ef05e8dee264cc11ee07735132691801d360d",
"timestamp": "2024-10-14T08:54:39.222Z",
"token_flow": [
{ "coin": "SUI", "amount": "431391181040", "formatted": "431.39118104 SUI", … },
{ "coin": "KONG", "amount": "-4499000000", "formatted": "-449900000 KONG (unverified)", … }
],
"events": [
{ …, "event_type": "0x91bfbc38…::pool::SwapEvent",
"parsed": { "pool": "0x48ff70ae056c64407ebf08dc532964434ef2108b2b232e7a01d78d17f51123b7", … } },
…
]

The deployer’s transaction exchanged 449,900,000 KONG for about 431.39 SUI in the Turbos KONG/SUI pool at 08:54 UTC on 14 October.

token_flow is the sender’s net across the whole transaction, while get_transaction can read an individual swap’s direction from its pool event when that event identifies the coins and can be assigned to one call. For a route with several swaps, check each action and its event before interpreting the net as one swap. History, timeline and fund trace action labels have no pool-event evidence and may use the call’s type arguments instead.

find_pools takes the full type for an unverified coin:

{ "token_a": "0xb0c3e7ae67c9161273aab9a06e589c1c13479337d14c794251a97df46822f2cb::kong::KONG",
"token_b": "SUI" }

The result lists pools, total and each venue’s search status under venues. It searches Cetus, DeepBook v2/v3, Turbos, BlueMove v1, Bluefin, Momentum, FlowX CLMM/v2, Magma, Aftermath AMM and Kriya v2. Use omitted.next_call to page a long pool list. A failed or bounded venue search cannot establish that the pair has no other pools.

3. Find where the sellers’ SUI converged

Section titled “3. Find where the sellers’ SUI converged”

summarize_address_flows on the consolidation wallet over two hours on 24 October:

{ "address": "0xfbbab0fdf16bd65d7ff7d17b86e0086892573337b6e7f466794506bc8aa6c0f3",
"from": "2024-10-24T06:00:00Z", "to": "2024-10-24T08:00:00Z", "top": 30 }
"coverage": { "scanned_transactions": 36, "complete": true, … },
"coins": [ { …, "symbol": "SUI", …, "in": 7650.187157164, "out": 0, …, "transactions_in": 36, … } ],
"inflow_source_count": 35,
"inflow_sources": [
{ "address": "0x6730b5661d2a741d810ab425112507979326d09906874b265a80e0dd1a172f32",
"coins": [ { "symbol": "SUI", "amount": 4910.77, … } ], … },
…
{ "address": "0x70f1042521565aa5c3fb887f939ef05e8dee264cc11ee07735132691801d360d",
"coins": [ { "symbol": "SUI", "amount": 440.33, … } ], … },
…
]

The scan found 35 inflow sources sending 7,650.19 SUI between 06:39 and 07:01 UTC. The deployer is among them. The case file traces a 4,910.75 SUI payment into the largest sender, 0x6730b566…, from an address that received 1,000,000,000 KONG from the deployer.

trace_flow_graph forward from the consolidation wallet, SUI only:

{ "address": "0xfbbab0fdf16bd65d7ff7d17b86e0086892573337b6e7f466794506bc8aa6c0f3", "direction": "forward",
"from": "2024-10-24T06:48:00Z", "coin_type": "0x2::sui::SUI", "max_depth": 5, "max_nodes": 60 }
"edges": [
{ "from": "0xfbbab0fdf16bd65d7ff7d17b86e0086892573337b6e7f466794506bc8aa6c0f3|…::sui::SUI",
"to": "0x97ab09d16d5c8ffb611abac70ccbe3898a2b11802589df4e6206fbc09afb4e97|…::sui::SUI",
"amount_formatted": "7649 SUI", "first_time": "2024-10-29T16:07:34.678Z",
"digests": [ "6sdKKWtJiWtUmvs4B58HBqKh8cWWmCJSRhmvttEMTSV6" ], … }
]

The graph shows 7,649 SUI sent to 0x97ab09d1… on 29 October. It stops at that address because it pools SUI from many senders, so its later transfers are not traced as a continuation of these funds and need a separate read.

get_transaction on the next transfer out of 0x97ab09d1:

{ "digest": "E3rCEX7ex5uBuPpZ9scXeChkMGaZha5gVRk4Qxiheg53" }
"sender": "0x97ab09d16d5c8ffb611abac70ccbe3898a2b11802589df4e6206fbc09afb4e97",
"timestamp": "2024-10-29T16:15:15.287Z",
"balance_changes": [
{ "address": "0x97ab09d16d5c8ffb611abac70ccbe3898a2b11802589df4e6206fbc09afb4e97", "amount": "-7649000000000", … },
{ "address": "0xf8b7b95d01ae79756fc3d1bc58675e59a17f07cdafe3d31ea57425adbec2d43f", "amount": "7648999230240", … }
]

Eight minutes later, 0x97ab09d1… sent nearly 7,649 SUI to 0xf8b7b95d…. This transfer alone does not identify the recipient as an exchange wallet.

find_funding_source:

{ "address": "0x70f1042521565aa5c3fb887f939ef05e8dee264cc11ee07735132691801d360d" }
"origin": {
"address": "0xf8b7b95d01ae79756fc3d1bc58675e59a17f07cdafe3d31ea57425adbec2d43f",
"label": "MEXC reserve wallet", "category": "cex",
"label_provenance": { "entity": "MEXC", "evidence": "proof-of-reserves-listed",
"source_url": "https://por.mocortech.com/MEXC_PoR_Audit_20260910.pdf", … }
},
"chain": [
{ …, "funded_by": "0xf8b7b95d01ae79756fc3d1bc58675e59a17f07cdafe3d31ea57425adbec2d43f",
"funding_tx": "DGbdmrFNNmMT29KzUmzug3wr2sXBSbh7SRywMvVawcma",
"timestamp": "2024-09-26T01:45:04.246Z", "amount": "710 SUI", … }
],

The first funding transaction sent the deployer 710 SUI from 0xf8b7b95d… about four hours before publication. The same address received the later transfer in step 5. A MEXC proof-of-reserves listing identifies it as a reserve wallet.

  • Mint and upgrade authority describe the capabilities the audit located; they do not establish that a token is safe to trade. KONG’s audited caps could not mint or upgrade it at the time read, and the deployer sold into the pool.
  • The sale, the 35 inflow sources and the exit are chain facts. That the 35 wallets are one operator is an inference from the convergence and from the funding links in the case file.
  • The proof-of-reserves listing attributes 0xf8b7b95d… to MEXC, but this transfer does not identify whose exchange account received it. classify_deposit_address on 0x97ab09d1… reads its recent sweeps, not the October 2024 ones, so its verdict can differ from the shape seen here.
  • A funder’s other recipients cannot be attributed to the deployer merely because the funder paid them.